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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of the Case 
The Idaho Department ofFish and Game and Director Moore (collectively "IDFG") 
hereby appeal the district court's denial of their June 9, 2010 post-judgment motion to partially 
lift an injunction in a nuisance action that had closed the historic Farragut Shooting Range. The 
injunction required IDFG to make certain safety improvements to reopen the Range for up to 500 
shooters per year, and to make additional safety improvements and noise abatement measures to 
open the Range to over 500 shooters per year. 
IDFG based its motion on improvements made to a portion of the Range to comply with 
the injunction's stated condition to reopen the Range for up to 500 shooters per year. IDFG also 
based its motion on additional improvements made to comply with the injunction's more 
stringent conditions to reopen the Range for more than 500 shooters, and on post-judgment 
action by the Idaho Legislature to adopt noise and other standards for state outdoor sport 
shooting ranges. The district court summarily denied IDFG's request to reopen the Range for 
more than 500 shooters, concluding the statutory standards for state outdoor sport shooting 
ranges violated the Idaho Constitution's prohibition on certain types of "special legislation" and 
separation of judicial and legislative powers. As a result of this denial, the district court did not 
address the specific merits of IDFG's compliance with safety measures to exceed 500 shooters. 
The district court concluded IDFG had complied with a reasonable interpretation of the 
safety requirement to lift the injunction for up to 500 shooters; nevertheless, it denied IDFG's 
motion to reopen the Range to up to 500 shooters after concluding IDFG should install certain 
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additional features to address safety issues "implicit" in the Judgment or "overlooked" by the 
parties and the court in the pre-Judgment proceedings. 
B. Statement of Facts 
The Farragut Shooting Range, near the unincorporated town of Bayview in Kootenai 
County, has been used as a shooting range since the U.S. Navy established it as part of the World 
War II Farragut Naval Training Center in 1942. AR 82,234. IDFG acquired ownership of the 
Range after the War (id.), and use of the Range continued at levels that were disputed in these 
proceedings. In 2007, the Range had a berm behind the target area (also called a backstop) (see 
Exh. PPP), but did not have any safety baffles or side berms. See AR 239, Find. of Fact ~22. 
After the district court enjoined operation of the Range because of safety and noise 
concerns, IDFG chose not to appeal the Judgment, and proceeded to make Range improvements 
to comply with the terms of the injunction. IDFG renovated a portion of the Range for a 100-
yard shooting area, with shooting only allowed from 12 designated shooting positions in a 6' by 
72' area covered by a three-sided shooting shed. AR 947, Find. of Fact ~~1O-11; Exh. MMM, 
NNN, PPP. To meet the condition to reopen this area for up to 500 shooters, IDFG installed 
safety baffles to cover each of the 12 shooting positions to prevent shooters (from prone to 
standing) from firing their weapons above the shooting area's back berm. See AR 949, Find. of 
Fact ~23. To meet the conditions to reopen this portion of the Range to more than 500 shooters 
per year, IDFG installed a series of overhead and side baffles, side berms, and a shooting shed 
(see AR 948-49 Find. of Fact ~~13-23, Exh. PPP) to prevent a shooter from seeing "Blue Sky" 
downrange to prevent bullet escapement from the property owned and controlled by IDFG. 
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IDFG took these and other measures to meet and surpass the injunction's safety conditions, and 
to comply with noise and other standards adopted by the Idaho Legislature in 2008 in the Idaho 
Outdoor Sport Shooting Act, applicable to the Range. 
C. Course of Proceedings 
This action began on August 22, 2005, when Plaintiffs Citizens against Range Expansion 
et al. ("CARE") filed a complaint asserting nuisance and other causes of action and seeking 
injunctive and other reliefregarding IDFG's operation of the Range. AR 14-33. CARE alleged 
a substantial change in Range use and sought to enjoin IDFG's continued use of the Range and 
implementation of a proposed Master Plan for renovating the Range. See AR 47-63. 
Following discovery, summary judgment proceedings, and a trial December 11-14,2006, 
the district court issued a Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on February 23, 2007 (AR 220-279) and a Judgment on March 2, 2007 (AR 280-283). In 
its 2007 Memorandum Decision, the district court determined the Range was, "[ e ]xcept for the 
fact that the existing range contains no baffle," relatively safe for what the court concluded was 
the annual use in 2002, based on incomplete usage records, of "perhaps up to 250 shooters .... " 
AR 265-66, Conci. of Law ~7. The district court also determined that Range operations for up to 
500 shooters per year were "not likely to be a nuisance." AR 266-67, Conci. of Law ~7. 
Nevertheless, the district court concluded the current operation of the Range allowed bullet 
escapement beyond agency-controlled boundaries "into the Surface Danger Zone encompassing 
plaintiffs' private property and Farragut State Park property open to members of the public, 
constitut[ing] a clear and present danger to the safety and health of plaintiffs and other persons in 
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the area." AR 265, ConcL of Law ~6; see AR 247, Find. of Fact ~~36-40; see also Exh. 2 at 2, 9 
(fig. 2); Exh. 32 (depicting Surface Danger Zone for the unbaffled Farragut Range). 
In its Judgment, the district court granted injunctive relief requiring IDFG to close the 
Farragut Shooting Range "until a baffle is installed over every firing position." AR 281; see also 
AR 278. The district court required that the baffle "be placed and be of sufficient size that the 
shooter, in any position (standing, kneeling, prone), cannot fire his or her weapon above the 
berm behind the target." AR 281; see also AR 278. The sufficiency of baffles was to be 
established by agreement of the parties. AR 281. Absent agreement, the district court stated it 
would decide whether the baffles IDFG installed were sufficient to prevent the firing of weapons 
above the berm by viewing the premises itself. AR 281; see also AR 278. The district court 
ruled that "at such time as baffles are installed over every firing position and approved in the 
manner set forth, [IDFG] may operate the Farragut Shooting Range in the same manner in which 
it historically has (i.e., without any onsite supervision) for up to 500 shooters per year." AR 281-
82; see also AR 278. 
The district court concluded that if IDFG wished to exceed 500 shooters per year it must 
make further improvements "that will address safety and noise considerations." AR 267, Conel. 
of Law ~7. The district court established two additional conditions for opening the Range to 
more than 500 shooters per year: "safety measures adequate to prevent bullet escapement beyond 
the boundaries owned and controlled by [IDFG]" and "noise abatement measures to reduce noise 
to a decibel level agreed upon by the parties in the first instance, or, if the parties are unable to 
agree, to be set by the Court following further evidence." AR 282; see also AR 278-79. To 
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exceed 500 shooters per year, the district court specified in its February 23,2007 Order that 
"[t]he first concern (safety) can be satisfied only by the 'No Blue Sky' rule, or 'totally baffled 
... so that a round cannot escape[,]' as espoused by the nation's preeminent authority on range 
design and designer of the Vargas Master Plan, Clark Vargas." AR 278-79. 
On June 9,2010, IDFG filed a Motion for Partial Lifting ofInjunction. AR 293-297. In 
its Motion, IDFG sought to open the renovated 100-yard shooting area for up to 500 shooters, 
based on compliance with the Judgment's condition to install a baffle over every shooting 
position. AR 294. IDFG also sought to open the 100-yard shooting area for more than 500 
shooters, based on additional safety improvements that complied with either the "No Blue Sky 
Rule" or the baffle criteria espoused by Clark Vargas in Exh. 2 (with IDFG contending it met 
both the "No Blue Sky Rule" and Vargas criteria), and based on reliance on noise standards of 
the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act, Idaho Code § 67-9101 et seq., enacted in 2008 to 
regulate state outdoor sport shooting ranges such as the Farragut Range. AR 294-95; see AR 
906. 
The district court held a status conference on August 30, 2010 (TR8-34) and issued a 
Scheduling Order on September 17,2010, establishing a schedule for discovery and additional 
briefing for summary disposition of the matter, and providing for an evidentiary hearing if 
needed. See AR 8, 841. On December 28, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment asserting that Idaho Code § 67-9102 is unconstitutional. See AR 9; AR 865-66. 
Because the parties disagreed regarding compliance with the district court's condition to reopen 
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the Range for up to 50·0 shooters annually, IDFG filed a separate Motion for Court View to 
ensure compliance with the terms of the Judgment. AR 808-10; see also AR 295. 
Following summary disposition proceedings, the district court issued an interlocutory 
Memorandum Decision and Order on March 11,2011. AR 835-911. The district court 
determined it was appropriate to consider a partial reopening of the range for the 100-yard 
shooting area. See AR 908; see also AR 954 Concl. of Law ~5. The district court decided, 
however, any court view of the premises was not appropriate and denied IDFG's Motion for 
Court View, determining that "[a]ny future action which contemplated a view of the premises by 
the Court will have to be accomplished by trial." AR 856-59, 910. Thus, the district court 
modified sua sponte its 2007 Judgment, which had conditioned lifting ofthe injunction for up to 
500 shooters on a court view of the premises ifthe parties could not agree that the Judgment's 
requirements for baffling of shooting positions had been met. AR 910; see AR 281. The district 
court also concluded the noise standards of the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act 
violated the "special law" prohibition of art. III § 19 and the separation of powers requirement of 
art. V § 13 ofthe Idaho Constitution. AR 910. The district court also concluded that issues of 
material fact remained in dispute as to range safety, both to allow IDFG to open the Range up to 
500 shooters per year and to expand beyond 500 shooters per year. AR 910-11. However, "due 
solely to the finding that the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act is unconstitutional, due to 
failure to address noise considerations alone," the district court denied IDFG's motion to 
partially lift the injunction to open the Range for more than 500 shooters per year. AR 910-11. 
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-The district court set a hearing to begin on June 13, 2011, limited to the taking of evidence on 
safety considerations for up to 500 shooters. AR 911; see also AR 953, Concl. of Law ,1. 
IDFG filed a motion for permission to appeal the district court's decision regarding the 
constitutionality of the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act on March 25,2011. AR 927. 
On April 20, 2011, the district court denied this motion. AR 912-19,927. This Court denied 
IDFG's motion for permission to appeal on May 26,2011. AR 11,927-28. 
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 13-14,2011. AR 928. On 
August 25,2011, the district court denied IDFG's Motion for Partial Lifting ofInjunction 
without further modifying its February 23,2007 Order. AR 957. The district court found IDFG 
had installed baffles over all 12 shooting positions in the 100-yard shooting area sufficient to 
prevent shooters (prone to standing) from "directly" firing above the berm behind the target. AR 
949, Find. of Fact '23. The district court also found that IDFG had installed a series of six 
overhead baffles over each shooting position, as well as additional side baffles, side berms, and 
other improvements. AR 947-49, Find. of Fact ,,13-23. However, the district court stated that 
its condition to prevent shooters from firing "above the berm behind the target" should be 
interpreted to encompass ricochets resulting from shooters firing "at, below, or in directions to 
the side of or away from the berm behind the target." AR 955, Concl. of Law '6. 
The district court found that its prohibition on "firing" above the berm should be 
interpreted to include ricochets "[b ]ecause the subject of ricochets were [sic] not discussed at the 
2006 trial" and because the court interpreted the word "round," which was excluded from the 
Judgment but used in the underlying Order, to prohibit the firing of "a round above the berm," to 
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include "ricochets." AR 955, Concl. of Law ~6; see also AR 985-986. The district court found 
the 100-yard shooting area violated the safety considerations it set forth in 2007 and that partial 
lifting of the injunction "should occur" after IDFG implemented "simple and relatively 
inexpensive" measures the court identified to contain ricochets: ground baffles in conjunction 
with overhead baffles and an eyebrow berm or bullet catcher near the top of the back berm to 
reduce ground ricochets caused by striking the floor of the range. AR 957, Concl. of Law ~12. 
On August 29, 2011, the district court awarded CARE its costs. See AR 973. CARE 
subsequently applied for attorney's fees (see AR 970), and IDFG objected and moved to 
disallow fees and costs (see id.). On November 14,2011, the district court rescinded its award of 
costs and granted IDFG's motion to disallow fees and costs. AR 970-88. In support of this 
decision, the district court found IDFG had not acted unreasonably by not making safety 
improvements that were "implicit" in the 2007 Order, and by not addressing issues, including 
ricochets, that the district court concluded had been "overlooked" by the district court and the 
parties at the time of the granting of injunctive relief. AR 985-86. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in finding a noise standard adopted by the Idaho 
Legislature for state outdoor sport shooting ranges to constitute legislative infringement on 
judicial power and a "special law" prohibited by the Idaho Constitution? 
2. Did the district court err in interpreting its injunction for reopening the Farragut 




The district court erred by: (1) finding legislatively adopted noise standards for outdoor 
state sport shooting ranges to be legislative infringement on judicial power and special 
legislation prohibited by the Idaho Constitution; and (2) interpreting the condition to reopen the 
Range to 500 shooters per year in a manner at odds with the requirements ofI.R.C.P. 65(d) and 
60(b) . 
A. The district court erred in concluding noise and other standards adopted by the 
Idaho Legislature for state outdoor sport shooting ranges are unconstitutional. 
The district court erred in denying IDFG's Motion to Partially Lift Injunction as it related 
to reopening the Range to more than 500 shooters per year by determining the 2008 Idaho 
Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act, which established noise and other standards for state outdoor 
sport shooting ranges, is unconstitutional. The district court erred by concluding that the Act 
violates the separation of powers doctrine and Idaho Constitution's prohibition against certain 
enumerated classes of "special" legislation. 
1. Standard of Review 
This Court exercises free review of a statute's constitutionality. Idaho Schools For Equal 
Educational Opportunity v. State, 140 Idaho 586, 590, 97 P.3d 453,457 (2004) ("ISEEO IV") 
(citation omitted). The statute must be "unconstitutional as a whole, without any valid 
application." Id. (quotation omitted). "[E]very presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of 
the statute, and the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statutory provision rests 
upon the challenger." Id. (quotation omitted). 
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2. The district court's determination that enactment of the Idaho Outdoor 
Sport Shooting Range Act deprives judicial power or jurisdiction in 
violation of art. V § 13 of the Idaho Constitution is at odds with 
established precedent. 
In its 2007 Memorandum Decision and Order, the district court recognized that noise 
standards are a proper subject oflegislative power. It reviewed state and local noise standards 
that might apply to shooting ranges, and found that Idaho did not have applicable statewide noise 
standards. AR 243. In its Judgment, the district court did not establish a noise standard for 
Range operations in fashioning prospective equitable relief, leaving that to future negotiation 
between the parties or post-judgment evidentiary hearing. AR 282; see also AR 278-79,867-69. 
In 2008, the Idaho Legislature enacted the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act, 
Idaho Code § 67-9101 et seq., which established prospective statewide noise standards for state 
outdoor sport shooting ranges and preempted local ordinances purporting to regulate the use and 
operation of such ranges. There is no dispute that Farragut and other state-owned shooting 
ranges are subject to the Act's requirements. 
In reviewing this legislative action in its March 11, 2011 decision, the district court stated 
that the litigation over the Farragut Range had identified a need for a noise standard stemming 
from the proposed expansion of the Farragut Range (AR 902), and noted that nothing in its 2007 
Order prohibited IDFG from seeking legislative enactment of a noise standard (AR 869). In this 
regard, the district court's order is consistent with well-settled doctrine regarding the separation 
of power between the judicial and legislative branches. 
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Nonetheless, the district court concluded the Idaho Legislature's enactment ofthe Idaho 
Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of judicial power 
"rightly pertain[ing]" to the judicial department under art. V § 13 ofthe Idaho Constitution. In 
reaching this conclusion, the district court cited only the case of ISEEO IV, 140 Idaho 586, 97 
P.3d 453, stating it has "similarities" with the present case. AR 903-4. 
According to the district court, "[w]hile IDFG did not ask the Idaho Legislature to rewrite 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (as the Idaho Supreme Court found the legislature did in 
ISSEO [sic] IV), nothing in Article V, § 13 requires so egregious an act." AR 904. In analyzing 
art. V § 13, however, the district court failed to specify what power rightly pertaining to the 
judiciary was deprived by passage of the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act. 
The district court's conclusion is a significant and unwarranted expansion of the holding 
of ISEEO IV. The ISEEO IV decision addressed legislation purporting to establish procedures 
for suits alleging failure of the Legislature's constitutional duty to establish a "uniform and 
thorough system of public, free, cornmon schools," and requiring dismissal of any then-pending 
suit against the State if such procedures were not followed. ISEEO IV, 140 Idaho 586, 97 P.3d 
453. The Court found such legislative action to violate the art. III § 19 prohibition on enactment 
of special laws "[r]egulating the practice ofthe courts of justice," since it was "designed only to 
affect one particular lawsuit" and "purports to make decisions regarding this litigation that only 
the district court can make." ISEEO IV, 140 Idaho at 592-93, 97 P.3d at 459-60. The Court went 
on to conclude that the Legislature's enactment of procedural rules specific to the then-pending 
lawsuit was not within the authority granted the Legislature by art. V § 13 to "regulate by law, 
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when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all courts below the 
Supreme Court .... " ISEEO IV, 140 Idaho at 593,97 P.3d at 460 (emphasis in original). The 
ISEEO IV Court concluded that the Legislature's desire "to direct the outcome of a case" seeking 
to require "the Legislature to fulfill a constitutionally mandated duty" was not "sufficiently 
necessary so as to justify rewriting the Court's rules of procedure." Id. In short, the ISEEO IV 
decision applies only to circumstances where the Legislature asserts authority under art. V § 13 
to alter court procedures for the purpose of dismissing a pending lawsuit against the State. 
Unlike the legislation at issue in ISEEO IV, the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act 
involves the exercise of the Legislature's police power to regulate the use of state property, and 
nothing in the Act attempts to regulate the courts in the exercise of their powers. The specific 
provisions of the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act are well within the Legislature's 
authorities regarding regulation of noise and activities on state property. "By our Constitution 
the power to make and determine policy for the government of the State is vested in the 
Legislature, Idaho Const. Art. 2, § 1, and Art. 3, § 1." Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311, 325, 341 
P.2d 432,440 (l959)(citations omitted). 
The district court would extend ISEEO IV's application of art. V § 13 to prohibit 
legislative enactment of substantive regulations in response to a court decision stating its intent 
to establish such standards judicially as part of an executory order. It has long been established, 
however, that an executory decree directing the abatement of a nuisance ceases to be enforceable 
if the underlying laws of nuisance are altered legislatively. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and 
Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1855). Such a change in law during the course of an 
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executory decree does not have the effect and operation of annulling the judgment of the court, 
since continuing decrees are subject to adjustment in response to changes in circumstances. Id. 
In Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 290, 221 P.3d 81,88 (2009), this Court, discussing 
Wheeling and other federal decisions, held that '" [ a] continuing decree of injunction directed to 
events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need, '" including 
"changes in law or circumstance." !d., quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 
(1932). Idaho precedent repeatedly confirms that legislative modification of common or 
statutory law in response to court holdings does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. 
E.g., Moon v. North Idaho Famers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 545, 96 P.3d 637,646 (2004), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 1146 (2005). When litigation identifies a gap in substantive regulations, it is 
well within the Legislature'S constitutional authority to craft a solution. 
Moreover, the district court's reasoning is at odds with precedent establishing that it is 
improper for the courts to infringe on the Idaho Legislature's exercise of its constitutional police 
powers. "Just as Article II of the Idaho Constitution prohibits the Legislature from usurping 
powers properly belonging to the judicial department, so does that provision prohibit the 
judiciary from improperly invading the province of the Legislature." ISEEO IV, 140 Idaho at 
597,97 P.3d at 464 (citation omitted). 
In a case involving the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code § 6-901 et seq., the Court 
noted that its role in determining the scope of common law sovereign immunity changed once 
the Legislature filled a statutory void: 
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For the future, our posture is necessarily different. The situation is simply not the 
same where the legislature has enacted the doctrine of sovereign immunity by 
statute as it is prior to the time when the legislature has entered the field at all. 
Haegv. City a/Pocatello, 98 Idaho 315, 318, 563 P.2d 39, 42 (1977). Thus, in the absence of 
statutory noise standards, the district court could determine the level at which noises from the 
Farragut Range constituted a nuisance, but once the Legislature exercised its regulatory police 
powers to establish noise standards, the court was obligated to apply such standards. 
3. The district court erred in determining the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting 
Range Act is an unconstitutional "special law" under art. III § 19 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
The district court determined that the Idaho Sport Shooting Range Act is "special law" 
that falls within the enumerated cases prohibited by art. III § 19 of the Idaho Constitution. The 
district court's analysis is at odds with precedent. 
a. Legislative Enactment 
The Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act was one of two pieces of legislation 
enacted in 2008 related to sport shooting ranges. Prior to 2008, title 55, chapter 26, Idaho Code 
addressed both private and public sport shooting ranges. The Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting 
Range Act (BB 515) created a new chapter 91 in title 67 (State Government and State Affairs) to 
address the class of state outdoor sport shooting ranges, excluding totally enclosed facilities, law 
enforcement, and military ranges. The Act established noise standards and other criteria for state 
outdoor sport shooting ranges and preempted local regulatory authority over these ranges. 
A second piece oflegislation (BB 604) added a new section to title 55, Idaho Code § 55-
2605, and made other amendments to chapter 26, title 55. HB 604 created a new definition for 
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outdoor sport shooting ranges, which excluded totally enclosed facilities and state outdoor ranges 
covered by the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act, and included all other outdoor sport 
shooting and law enforcement ranges. HB 604 continued to allow county regulation of outdoor 
sport shooting ranges under title 55, but preempted counties from imposing noise standards more 
restrictive than those adopted for state outdoor sport shooting ranges in § 67-9102. 
Taken together, these two laws subject all current and future outdoor sport shooting 
ranges in the state to a regulatory noise standard of no lower than a time-weighted metric (leq(h)) 
of 64 dBA. Fot state outdoor sport shooting ranges, the Legislature chose to select the most 
restrictive noise standard it identified for local regulation of other shooting ranges. 
h. "Tests" for Special Laws 
Neither the noise standard nor the preemption of local authority in the Idaho Outdoor 
Sport Shooting Range Act falls within the enumerated cases for which art. III § 19 prohibits 
special laws, and the Idaho Constitution "contains no catch-all restriction against special laws 
where a general law would apply." Jones v. State Bd of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 877, 555 P.2d 
399,417 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). Indeed, there is no constitutional bar to the 
Legislature'S enacting a local or special noise standard. 
Although CARE failed to specify which provision of art. III § 19 the Idaho Outdoor Sport 
Shooting Range Act allegedly violated, the district court presumed CARE intended to refer to the 
prohibition of "limitation of civil and criminal actions." AR 870. Although CARE's Motion for 
Summary Judgment focused solely on the status of the noise standards of § 67-9102 as a "special 
law," the district court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the distinction between the tests 
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employed for "special laws" and "local laws," and spoke at some length as to the lack of clarity 
regarding Idaho Supreme Court precedent. See AR 872 ("hats off to anyone who can read [a 
quoted portion of Moon, 140 Idaho at 546,96 P.3d at 647] in one sitting and then articulate the 
present test for what 'special laws,' the present test for 'local laws,' and what prior appellate 
precedent is abrogated"). 
In large part, the district court's decision was based on its determination to resolve a 
"seeming incongruity" in this Court's decisions establishing the test for identification of special 
laws, which ultimately led the district court to ask, "so, what is the test for 'special laws'?" AR 
874 (emphasis in original). Ultimately, the district court formulated its own definition of 
"special laws": 
[I]t can be distilled that the feature of "special laws" or "special legislation" is: all 
persons subject to it are not treated alike as to privileges, protection and in every 
other respect (or, stated differently, the feature of "special laws" or "special 
legislation" is that: the statute does not apply to all persons and subject-matter in 
like situations) and, the legislation is "capricious, unreasonable or arbitrary" 
language is added to that test (under Jones v. Power County [27 Idaho 656, 150 P. 
35 (1915)], as recognized in Moon). 
AR 875 (underlining in original). 
In a surprising analytical turn, however, the district court seemingly ignored its own 
formulation of the "special laws" test and concluded that the analysis of whether the Idaho 
Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act was special legislation was not limited to the terms of the Act 
but also "encompasses the context in which the Act was discussed before and passed by the 
Idaho legislature." AR 880. Citing the ISEEO IV decision (AR 881), in which this Court cited 
legislative findings to determine that "the Legislature was in reality enacting special legislation 
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directed specifically at the ISEEO case and particularly, the Plaintiffs and their cause of action 
against the Legislature," 140 Idaho at 592,97 P.3d at 459, the district court delved into the 
legislative history of the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act. 
Finding "the Idaho Legislature seems to have learned from its mistake made public in 
ISEEO IV where it advertised its legislative response to a judicial action in the first paragraph of 
the bill," the district court extended its analysis beyond the text of the statute to committee 
minutes. AR 882. The district court did not, however, study the legislative history to determine 
legislative intent; rather, it undertook to compare the factual findings it had previously developed 
in this case with testimony before the Legislature. AR 882-88. The district court cited testimony 
of a member of the Fish and Game Commission urging adoption oflegislative noise standards 
for all state-owned sport shooting ranges in response to the controversy surrounding the Farragut 
Shooting Range. AR 882-84. Ignoring statements and documentation in the court record 
corroborating the Commissioner's testimony, 1 as well as the fact that IDFG retained the right in 
legislative proceedings to refer to facts not in the court record and to disagree with the court's 
factual findings, the district court concluded that the Commissioner's statements to the 
Legislature were "patently false" and "included a host of inaccuracies." AR 882-84. 
Most notably, the district court found the Commissioner's statement that the Commission 
would like to increase use of the Range to 3,000 shooters per year "takes the cake" because the 
1 See AR 691-783, including Affidavits submitted by IDFG in conjunction with the post-judgment summary 
proceedings, regarding documentation in the record of discovery of some of the range usage records from the 1980s 
and 1990s; the proximity of some residences to 2 other IDFG shooting ranges in Garden Valley and Blacks Creek; 
and IDFG's November 2007 decision to not proceed with the Vargas Master Plan and to scale back plans for the 
Range. 
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district court had interpreted statements in an earlier IDFG grant application to evidence IDFG's 
desire to improve the range to handle 46,426 shooters in a month, which the court's findings 
extrapolated to 557,112 shooters per year. AR 884-85 (citing AR238, Find. of Fact ~19). 
Ignoring the possibility that IDFG both disputed the accuracy of the court's finding and that the 
Commission had altered its plans for the Range following the conclusion of the litigation, the 
Court concluded that "IDFG tells the granting authority one thing to get the $3.6 million, and an 
entirely different thing to the Idaho Legislature in its effort to circumvent this litigation in which 
it finds itself." AR 885.2 
The district court's determination that the legislation was an impermissible "special law" 
was based, in part, on its determination that: 
[T]o the extent the Idaho legislature was given information about House Bill 515, 
at every juncture it included a reference to this litigation. The information given 
was at every juncture incomplete (compared to the information given this Court) 
and at one occasion, the information about the litigation was almost completely 
false. 
AR 887-88. The district court's comparison of testimony provided to the Legislature to the 
court's previous findings of fact to determine the truthfulness of the legislative testimony is 
unprecedented, and its employment of such findings to make a determination that the 
suhsequently enacted legislation was a "special law" did not comply with this Court's precedents 
defining "special legislation." 
2Afier the June 2011 evidentiary hearing, however, the district court found that IDFG was in fact "no longer 
pursuing the Vargas Master Plan for Farragut Range and has scaled back its plans for use of the Farragut Shooting 
Range," a finding corroborating the very legislative testimony that the district court had found "takes the cake." AR 
947, Find. of Fact ~12. 
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c. Reasonableness of Legislative Classification 
The "general purpose" of art. III § 19's prohibition on specifically enumerated categories 
of special and local legislation is "to prevent legislation bestowing favors on preferred groups or 
localities." Jones, 97 Idaho at 876,555 P.2d at 416 (citation omitted). The district court found 
that the Act "without a doubt" violates the general purpose of art. III § 19 because "on its face" 
the legislation "only inures to the benefit of the State, and the legislative history shows that it 
was designed to inure to the benefit only of IDFG and only (or at least primarily) for this 
litigation." AR 888-89 (emphasis in original). Both aspects of this reasoning, however, are 
unsound. 
The Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act employs a classification of "state outdoor 
sport shooting ranges" to which the standards of the Act apply. The district court recognized that 
the "Act is general in that it applies all over the State ofIdaho, but the Act has a 'local 
application' to only possibly four ranges (three of which are in uninhabited areas) and it does not 
'operate equally upon all subjects for which the rule is adopted' if 'subjects' are citizens of 
Idaho." AR 896. In essence, the district court ignored the classification applied by the 
Legislature, and crafted its own classification, finding that "this Act applies only to these citizens 
around the Farragut range." ld. 
The district court's decision ignores the fundamental principle that "[ w ]hether laws are 
general or not does not depend upon the number of those within the scope of their operation. 
They are general, 'not because they operate upon every person in the state, for they do not, but 
because every person who is brought within the relations and circumstances provided for is 
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affected by the laws.'" AR 895, citing Mix v. Bd. o/Commr's o/Nez Perce County, 18 Idaho 
695, 706, 112 P. 215, 218-219 (1910). The fact that the State owns a limited number of sport 
shooting ranges is irrelevant to the determination of whether it was reasonable for the Idaho 
Legislature to conclude that the state's legitimate government interest in providing shooting 
facilities for improvement of firearm skills, mandatory hunter education, recreational and other 
purposes should not be frustrated by local regulations. There is no minimum acreage 
requirement in the Idaho Constitution for establishment of statutory standards for use of state 
property. Moreover, the noise standards apply not only to existing state sport shooting ranges, 
but to any future ranges the state may acquire. 
In short, the district court failed to acknowledge the Legislature'S authority to adopt 
regulations specific to a certain class of state property even if the properties subject to the 
classification are limited in number. Such legislation can constitute a general law, even if the 
state is treated differently than its local or private counterparts. There are many unique interests, 
duties, and characteristics inherent to sovereign governmental functions, as well as proprietary 
functions performed on the public's behalf. Any of these interests may make it "reasonable" for 
the Legislature to employ classifications based on the distinctions between governmental and 
private entities and governmental and private property. For example, the Legislature determined 
that the subject matter of state-owned buildings is completely covered by general law and may 
not be subjected to an ordinance that is purely local in nature. Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 
610 P.2d 517 (1980). 
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d. The district court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the 
Legislature on factual issues in determining that the legislation was 
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. 
The ISEEO IV decision determined that "[for legislation] to be characterized as a general 
law, it must be for a legitimate legislative interest and cannot be arbitrary, capricious, or 
unreasonable." ISEEO IV, 140 Idaho at 591,97 P.3d at 458; see AR 879. The district court 
concluded that the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act violated the "arbitrary, capricious, 
and unreasonable" prong of this Court's "special law" analysis because: 
[T]he Idaho Legislature passed a law regarding noise limitations, and in doing so: 
a) did not ask for any scientific information, b) accepted information which is 
incomplete and at times false and c) either failed to realize (best case) or ignored 
the fact (worst case) that what they were being asked to do was in direct response 
to litigation .... 
AR 899; see also AR 886 ("the legislation itself incorporates a [noise] metric that this Court 
found flawed"). 
The district court's willingness to substitute its judgment regarding the veracity of facts 
presented to the Legislature violates a fundamental precept of judicial review: 
Where a statute, ordinance or regulation presents a proper field for the exercise of 
the police power, the extent of its invocation and application is a matter which lies 
very largely in the legislative discretion, and every presumption is to be indulged 
in favor of the exercise of that discretion, unless arbitrary action is clearly 
disclosed. The subject matter of the ordinance being within the police power, and 
properly belonging to the legislative department of government, the courts will 
not interfere with the discretion, nor inquire into the motive or wisdom of the 
legislature. If the act is not clearly unreasonable, capricious, arbitrary or 
discriminatory, it will be upheld as a proper exercise of the police power. 
The courts may differ with the legislature as to the wisdom and propriety of a 
particular enactment as a means of accomplishing a particular end, but as long as 
there are considerations of public health, safety, morals, or general welfare which 
the legislative body may have had in mind, which have justified the regulation, it 
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must be assumed by the court that the legislative body had those considerations in 
mind and that those considerations did justify the regulation. When the necessity 
or propriety of an enactment is a question upon which reasonable minds might 
differ, the propriety and necessity of such enactment is a matter of legislative 
determination. 
Dry Creek Partners, LLC, v. Ada County Comm'rs, 148 Idaho 11, 19,217 P.3d 1282, 
1290 (2009), quoting State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 375-76, 399 P.2d 955,961 (1965); see also V-
1 Oil Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 134 Idaho 716,720,9 P.3d 519,523 (2000) ("a legislative 
choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data"), quoting F C. C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 
508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993); Ransom v. City of Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 205, 743 P.2d 70, 
73 (1987) ("In addition, courts must not intrude into realms of policy exceeding their 
institutional competence. The judicial branch lacks the fact-finding ability of the legislature, and 
the special expertise of the executive departments .... [Courts] should not attempt to balance the 
detailed and competing elements of legislative or executive decisions"), quoting Industrial 
Indem. Co. v. State, 669 P.2d 561, 563 (Alaska 1983). 
The district court's holding is at odds with this broad array of precedents recognizing that 
the courts may not countermand the Legislature's authority to engage in fact-finding and to 
balance competing facts and interests. It is within the Legislature's police powers to balance the 
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state's legitimate government interest in the reasonable use and regulation of state property for 
shooting ranges for safety instruction and recreational purposes with the interests of persons that 
may be impacted by noise associated with such activities. 
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The Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act specifies a legislative finding "that state 
outdoor sport shooting ranges should be subject to uniform noise standards .... " Idaho Code § 
67-9102(2). To accomplish this, the Legislature adopted noise standards from Arizona statutes 
that fall within a range of generally accepted noise regulation principles. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 
17-602 (including a legislative finding that "outdoor shooting range noise standards are a matter 
of statewide concern"). It was well within the Legislature's authority to adopt legislation from a 
sister state without conducting its own independent scientific inquiry into the factual basis of the 
standard. 3 
Nonetheless, the district court ostensibly applied the second "arbitrary," "capricious," or 
"unreasonable" test to the law as a whole to justify greatly expanding the level of review by 
which courts traditionally evaluate the merits of legislative actions. By concluding the noise 
standard to be arbitrary, because it was established with "little or no scientific input" (AR 901) 
and employed a noise measurement methodology that the court "found flawed" (AR 886), the 
district court upset the established burden for determining the constitutionality of statutes. 
Instead of "every presumption [being made] in favor of the constitutionality of the statute, and 
the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality rest[ing] upon the challenger," ISEEO IV, 140 
Idaho at 590, 97 P.3d at 457 (citation omitted), the district court would require the Legislature to 
3 In addition to the two pieces of legislation regarding outdoor sport shooting ranges, a third piece of legislation 
enacted in 2008, SB 1441, preempted local authorities from adopting ordinances regulating, restricting or 
prohibiting discharges of frrearms, including those: in lawful self-defense and hunting; by private landowners; from 
title 55 sport shooting ranges (with local authority preempted at state sport shooting ranges under Title 67); and in 
the course of target shooting on public land if the discharge will not endanger persons or property. Idaho Code § 18-
3302J. This legislation found "that uniform laws regulating frrearms are necessary to protect the individual citizen's 
right to bear arms guaranteed" by the u.s. and Idaho Constitutions. Id. 
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demonstrate judicial-sty Ie fact-finding before enactment of legislation. Important public policy 
considerations should be weighed before courts impose upon the Idaho Legislature the same 
principles that support judicial economy, finality, and efficiency. 
In addition to its effect on the Farragut and other IDFG ranges, the district court's 
determination that Idaho Code § 67-9101 et seq. are unconstitutional also effectively invalidates 
portions of Idaho Code § 55-2605 that prohibit local governments from establishing noise 
standards for outdoor sport shooting ranges more restrictive than the standards in § 67-9102. 
The Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act does not violate the Idaho Constitution's 
prohibition on certain classes of "special" legislation, and is well within the constitutional 
powers of the Idaho Legislature. 
B. The district court erred in interpreting the Judgment's conditions for reopening 
the Range for up to 500 shooters. 
1. Standard of Review 
Rule 65( d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires that any "order granting an 
injunction ... shall be specific in terms [and] shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by 
reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained .... " 
LR.C.P.65(d). Thus, Rule 65 constrains whatever discretion district courts may generally have, 
as the draftsmen of their decisions and orders,4 to interpret the meaning of such orders. In 
4Reviewing courts in other jurisdictions have generally given deference to a district court's interpretation as the 
draftsman of its own order. See, e.g., Garcia v. Yonkers School Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 103 (2nd Cir. 2009); 
Fredericksburg Construction v. J W. Wyne Excavating, 260 Va. 137,530 S.E.2d 148 (2000). Reviewing courts have 
not, however, given equal deference to every aspect of a court's interpretation of its own order. "The abuse of 
discretion standard is used to evaluate the ... court's application of the facts to the appropriate legal standard, and the 
factual findings and legal conclusions underlying such decisions are evaluated under the clearly erroneous and de 
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interpreting the scope of an injunction, a district court is prohibited from interpreting its orders to 
enjoin actions not specifically described in reasonable detail in the terms of the injunction. 
In the absence of Idaho case law on the subject of specificity under Rule 
65( d), case law on the corresponding federal rule is pertinent. 
[Federal] Rule 65 serves to protect those who are enjoined []by informing 
them of what they are called upon to do or to refrain from doing in order 
to comply with the injunction or restraining order .... The drafting 
standard established by Rule 65( d) is that an ordinary person reading the 
court's order should be able to ascertain from the document itself exactly 
what conduct is proscribed. 
11A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2955 
(1995), quoted inHughe~v. JMS Development Corp., 78 F.3d 1523,1531, reh'g 
denied, 89 F.3d 857 (11t Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 993 (1996). Rule 65 (d) "is 
satisfied only if the enjoined party can ascertain from the four comers of the order 
precise7 what acts are forbidden or required." Petrello v. White, 533 F.3d 110, 
114 (2n Cir. 2008)(citations omitted), affirmed, 344 Fed. Appx. 651 (2nd Cir. 
2009)(unpublished, No. 09-0343-CV). 
AR 954-55, Concl. of Law ~6. 
In cases involving contempt sanctions, courts have construed injunctions narrowly where 
they fail to give adequate notice of prohibited or mandated conduct. See Abbott Labs. v. 
TorPharm, Inc., 503 F.3d 1372, 1382-3 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1031 (2008), 
quoting Ford v. Kammerer, 450 F.2d 279,280 (3d Cir. 1971) ("[Injunctions] are binding only to 
the extent they contain sufficient description of the prohibited or mandated acts .... 
novo standards, respect[ively]." Garcia v. Yonkers School Dis!., 561 F.3d at 103, quoting Matter a/VMS Sec. Litig., 
103 F.3d 1317,1323 (7th Cir.1996); see also In re Airadigm Communications, Inc., 616 F.3d 642,651 (ih Cir. 
2010), quoting Corporate Assets, Inc. v. Palo ian, 368 F.3d 761,767 (7th Cir. 2004)(concluding a court abuses its 
discretion "when its decision is premised on an incorrect legal principle or a clearly erroneous factual fmding, or 
when the record contains no evidence on which the court rationally could have relied"); In re Tomlin, 105 F.3d 933, 
940 (4th Cir.1997)( concluding a reviewing court "may resort to the record upon which the judgment was based" to 
construe a lower court's order)(quotation omitted). 
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[A]mbiguities and omissions in orders redound to the benefit of the person charged with 
contempt.") and 11A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2955 ("Since ... only 
those acts specified by the order will be treated as within its scope and ... no conduct or action 
will be prohibited by implication, all omissions or ambiguities ... will be resolved in favor of 
[the enjoined party]."). 
In applying Fed. R. Civ .P. 65(d) , the federal rule corresponding to I.R.C.P. 65(d) , a 
reviewing court concluded "[a]n injunction does not prohibit those acts that are not within its 
terms as reasonably construed." Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 385,387-88 
(5 th Cir. 1980)( citation omitted). "In determining whether a particular act falls within the scope 
of an injunction's prohibition, particular emphasis must be given to the express terms of the 
order." Id. 
In short, the standards ofl.R.C.P. 65(d), as well as the due process and equitable 
principles it embodies, support narrow interpretations of both the enjoined activity and any 
conditions established for lifting the injunction. The means to obtain freedom from a court's 
contempt powers should be as readily understood as the actions subjecting a party to them. 
2. The district court's interpretation of its condition to reopen the Range 
for up to 500 shooters is at odds with the requirements of Rule 65( d). 
In its Judgment, the district court indicated the conditions for reopening the Range for up 
to 500 shooters and the manner in which it would approve the reopening of the Range: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that [IDFG is] 
directed and enjoined to close the Farragut Wildlife Management Area to all 
persons using pistols, rifles, and firearms using or intending to use live 
ammunition until a baffle is installed over every firing position. As set forth in 
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the Order entered February 23, 2007, all shooting ranges shall remain closed until 
the following condition is met regarding the installation of each baffle: 
The baffle must be placed and be of sufficient size that the shooter, in any 
position (standing, kneeling, prone) cannot fire his or her weapon above the berm 
behind the target. Either the parties shall agree that the baffles have been 
adequately installed or that issue shall be submitted for view of the premises by 
the Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that at such 
time as baffles are installed over every firing position and approved in the manner 
set forth, [IDFG] may operate the Farragut Shooting Range in the same manner in 
which it historically has (i.e., without any on site supervision), for up to 500 
shooters per year. 
AR 281-282. 
Based on CARE's conceding the fact in its pre-trial memorandum, as well as evidence 
presented at the hearing, the district court found "[t]he baffles at the lOa-yard shooting area are 
sufficient to prevent shooters from 'directly' firing above the berm behind the target from any of 
the 12 shooting positions (from prone to standing)." AR 949, Find. of Fact ~23. Nonetheless, 
the district court denied IDFG's June 9, 2010 Motion to Partially Lift InjunctionS and concluded 
as a matter of law: 
Simply because IDFG has installed at least one baffle over all 12 designated 
shooting positions at the lOa-yard shooting area, and such baffles are placed and 
of sufficient size that a shooter in any positions (standing, kneeling, prone) cannot 
fire his or her weapon above the berm behind the target at the lOa-yard shooting 
area does not mean IDFG has complied with the Court's 2007 condition to lift its 
2007 injunction for these 12 designated shooting positions, for up to 500 shooters 
per year. 
AR 955-56, Concl. ofLaw~6. 
5 The district court also denied a motion IDFG made at the beginning of the June 20 II evidentiary hearing to 




[I]t does not violate I.R.C.P. 65( d) to interpret the plain language and context of 
the Court's 2007 Order condition for up to 500 shooters (the installation of a 
baffle over every shooting position to prevent a shooter from firing over the berm 
behind the target), to encompass shooters firing at, below, or in directions to the 
side of or away from the berm behind the target. 
To reach these counterintuitive conclusions, the district court did not modify the 
Judgment establishing the conditions for re-opening the Range. Instead, it found that the term 
"round," which does not appear in the terms of the Judgment,6 included "ricochets," an issue not 
emphasized at the original trial, but raised by CARE in the post-judgment proceedings. AR 955. 
This legal conclusion interpreting the terms of the district court's prior orders is unreasonable, 
regardless of whether this Court employs de novo review or an abuse of discretion standard. 
Interpreting the injunction's condition to prohibit firing a weapon that may result in escapement 
of ricochets despite the lack of any such prohibition on the face of the injunction violates the 
requirements of Rule 65. 
Notably, the district court recognized that IDFG's interpretation of the injunction to only 
require construction of baffles that prevent the direct fire of bullets beyond the confines of the 
range was not without reason. In denying CARE's application for costs and attorneys' fees, the 
district court determined "it cannot be said that IDFG acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law in bringing an arguably legitimate dispute as to how to interpret that 2007 Order." AR 982. 
The district court also found: 
6 The word "round" appears only in the conditions set forth in the district court's February 23,2007 Memorandum 
Decision and Order for lifting the injunction to allow up to 500 shooters per year, if "plaintiffs agree that the 
shooter in any position cannot fire a round above the berm behind the target." AR 278. 
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The Court in 2007 did not specify that safety improvements had to include 
addressing ricochets, but that is because the topic of ricochets was not directly 
raised in 2007. What was discussed was safety and noise, and safety includes 
ricochets. While it seems odd for IDFG to ignore the issue of ricochets, it is 
understandable that IDFG would focus on live rounds escaping the range, given 
that the focus at the 2006 proceeding on safety concerns was the "no blue sky" 
concept, which addressed only direct shots at the target. Since that was the focus 
by the parties of the 2006 proceeding, it was the focus of this Court's February 
23,2007, decision. 
AR 983 (emphasis in original).7 
In its motion to partially lift the injunction, IDFG overlooked the issue of ricochets. 
Ricochets were not explicitly discussed in 2007. However, ricochets were certainly 
implicitly discussed in 2007 when the Court mentioned bullet "containment[.]" This 
Court wrote: 
The first concern (safety) can be satisfied only by the "No Blue Sky" rule, 
or "totally baffled ... so that a round cannot escape", as espoused by the 
nation's preeminent authority on range design and designer of the Vargas 
Master Plan, Clark Vargas. Exhibit 2, p. 5. Once bullet containment is 
achieved, it matters not for purposes of this litigation if the range is 
supervised (with bullet containment, supervision would only inure to the 
benefit of the participants, an important consideration, but not the subject 
of this lawsuit). 
February 23,2007, Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order, pp. 61-62. 
Simply because IDFG ignored the issue of bullet containment8 and ignored the 
practical fact that ricochets are bullets too, does not equate to IDFG acting without 
a reasonable basis in fact or in law. This is a complex case spanning several years. 
The fact is the parties did not initially (in 2006) directly discuss ricochets, and 
initially (in 2007), the Court did not discuss ricochets. But the fact that what 
7 The district court indicated a review of its notes from the 4-day 2006 trial showed '''ricochet' was only mentioned 
once, in passing, by [CARE's] expert Roy Ruel, when he mentioned a ricochet can occur off the ground or floor of 
the range." AR 941. The only testimony discussed in the 2007 Memorandum Decision in detail as to how bullets 
might escape was that ofMr. Ruel, whose testimony clearly focused on firing directly over the back berm. See AR 
246; see also Exh. 33, 34. 
8 The district court limited the June 2011 hearing to evidence on the standard for up to 500 shooters (AR 953, Conc!. 
of Law ~l). The standard the district court refers to here relates to bullet containment for more than 500 shooters, 
and was not before the court in the June 2011 hearing or related briefing. 
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appears to be an obvious issue (ricochets) was initially overlooked by the 
attorneys for each side and the one judge who was assigned the task of trying to 
resolve this complex litigation, underscores the need for a collaborative approach 
in the future. If all the stakeholders involved in this litigation worked together, 
the odds of overlooking an important issue are greatly reduced. 
AR 985-86; see also TR 141-42 ("The opinion does I think lend itself to an interpretation that as 
long as direct fire's been addressed, then the injunction should be relieved, at least as to this 
particular shooting position, but ... I think it would be naIve to limit - to have the language of 
the decision limited only to direct fire .... "). 
In explaining why IDFG's position was not without reason, the district court exposes the 
unreasonableness of its own interpretation. The district court confirmed that ricochets were not 
addressed in the four comers of the 2007 Memorandum Decision and Order or the 2007 
Judgment. In fact, the district court concedes the "topic" of ricochets was never directly 
discussed by the parties or the court during the course oflitigation.9 
The district court's discussion also indicates the court has confused the two standards it 
applied to lifting injunctive relief, one standard to allow reopening the range for up to 500 
shooters per year and a more stringent standard to exceed 500 shooters per year. The 2007 
Judgment set the following standard for reopening the Range to more than 500 shooters: 
9 As discussed in footnote 4, supra, reviewing courts in other jurisdictions have considered support in the record a 
factor in determining whether a lower court abused its discretion in interpreting an order. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADmDGED AND DECREED that the 
annual use level shall not exceed 500 shooters per year until and unless [IDFG] 
has constructed and installed safety measures adequate to prevent bullet 
escapement beyond the boundaries owned and controlled by [IDFG] and 
constructed and installed noise abatement measures to reduce noise to a decibel 
level agreed upon by the parties in the first instance, or, if the parties are unable to 
agree, to be set by the Court following further evidence. Such further use shall 
only be commenced upon Order of this Court following hearing establishing that 
the safety and noise concerns have been eliminated in the manner satisfactory to 
the Court based upon its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
AR282. 
As noted supra, the district court referred to the language of this more stringent 
requirement to explain how ricochets were "implicitly" addressed in its Order. The 2007 
Judgment and Memorandum Decision and Order contained no such references in the requirement 
for opening the Range for up to 500 shooters. The district court also acknowledged that the "No 
Blue Sky Rule," one of the only two methods the court allowed for complying with its stricter 
standard for opening the range to more than 500 shooters, "addressed only direct shots at the 
target .... " AR 983. Thus, interpreting the lesser safety standard (for up to 500 shooters) to 
encompass more than direct fire is inherently unreasonable. 
In addition, the district court's interpretation ignores the fact that the 2007 Judgment 
specified a particular physical feature--a safety baffle placed "over" each shooting position--to 
address its safety concerns for up to 500 shooters. AR 281; see also AR 278. The features of 
ground baffles, eyebrow berms, and bullet catchers are distinct from overhead baffles and were 
before the district court in 2007. See, e.g., AR 945-46 (discussing CARE's 2006 Trial Exh. 6 at 
5, Exh. 2 at 16); Exh. 38. Yet, the district court did not reference ground baffles, eyebrow berms 
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or bullet catchers in the conditions for lifting the injunction in 2007 for up to 500 shooters. Nor 
are they required to meet even the more stringent "No Blue Sky Rule" standard for more than 
500 shooters, as a shooter can have a "No Blue Sky" downrange view without them. See Exh. 
PPP. Interpretation of the Judgment to incorporate these additional features to open the Range 
for up to 500 shooters is unreasonable. 
As a matter of law, the Judgment did not require IDFG to make modifications necessary 
to prevent escapement of ricochets over the back bermlO to open the Range to up to 500 shooters, 
even when interpreted with reference to the entire record before the district court. Alternatively, 
the district court abused its discretion by interpreting its Judgment to require actions to prevent 
escapement of ricochets when the court itself acknowledges a lack of support in the record for 
such an interpretation. 
3. In its 2007 Order and Judgment, the district court clearly contemplated 
its standard to open the range for up to 500 shooters could be measured 
by a layperson's visual inspection. 
On its face, the Judgment did not contemplate additional argument over what 
features might be needed to open the Range for up to 500 shooters. The Judgment 
indicated that compliance with the requirement to install baffles over firing positions 
could be determined by visual inspection by a layperson in the form of the district court. 11 
10 There is an additional safety area behind the back berm (see AR 694, ~15) within the "boundaries owned and 
controlled by IDFG," the subject of the district court's more stringent escapement standard for opening the range to 
more than 500 shooters per year CAR 282). 
11 In addition to referencing the approval by court view in its Motion to Partially Lift Injunction CAR 295), IDFG 
subsequently made a Motion for Court View (AR 808-809) to ensure a clear record of its compliance with the 
mandate of the 2007 Judgment ("that issue shall be submitted for view of the premises by the Court"). See AR 281. 
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Either the parties shall agree that the baffles have been adequately installed or that 
issue shall be submitted for view of the premises by the Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that at such 
time as baffles are installed over every firing position and approved in the manner 
set forth, IDFG may operate the Farragut Shooting Range in the same manner in 
which it historically has (i.e., without any on site supervision), for up to 500 
shooters per year. 
AR 281. Similar language was contained in the February 23, 2007 Order: 
Once baffles are installed and either 1) plaintiffs agree that the shooter in any position 
cannot fire a round above the berm behind the target, or 2) if the plaintiffs cannot 
agree, the Court so finds after a view of the premises, the injunction will be lifted, 
and IDF&G may operate that range in the same manner in which it historically has 
(ie., without any on site supervision), up to 500 shooters per year. ... 
AR278. 
At the August 2011 status conference, however, the district court reinterpreted the 
manner in which it would approve the reopening of the Range for up to 500 shooters: 
I didn't say in my order that if the parties can't agree, the Court would conduct a 
view and not listen to opposing viewpoints, so I need to get this controversy 
before me, and ... the most appropriate way to do that is with a summary 
judgment motion. 
TR 24-25. 
[T]hat doesn't mean that it's simply going to be the Department submitting what 
it wants, the Court taking a view and calling it good ... , so we'll proceed under our 
rules of summary judgment, the parties address those issues as far as discovery 
cutoffs, expert disclosures, and the time for the hearing on summary judgment .... 
TR 32-33. 
Citing a withdrawn opinion of the Court criticizing this particular district court for its use 
of court views, the district court sua sponte modified its 2007 Order and Judgment to require an 
evidentiary hearing for reopening the Range for up to 500 shooters. AR 856-59; see also TR 45-
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52. Instead of satisfying the concern for establishing a record for a reviewing court by requiring 
photographic or video graphic evidence, which IDFG and CARE provided to the district court 
(see, e.g., Exh. PPP), the district court converted the case into an "expert intensive" one. See AR 
859; TR 52,1. 11-13. In doing so, the district court allowed CARE to retry key portions of their 
case outside the procedural requirements of the Rule 60(b) and to influence the district court's 
interpretation of its Order and Judgment with the introduction of "requirements" not referenced 
or relied upon in the pre-Judgment proceedings. 
4. The district court's interpretation is at odds with the parties' burdens for 
injunctive and post-jUdgment relief. 
IDFG has the burden of demonstrating it has met the conditions for lifting the injunction. 
Consistent with Rule 65( d), Rule 60(b) and the principles of due process and equitable relief (see 
AR 954, ~~5-6), however, it cannot conceivably be IDFG's burden to guess what "problems" 
CARE and the district court might have "overlooked" in the pre-Judgment proceedings. 
CARE had more than a year to develop its case regarding Range safety issues, with full 
discovery, its summary judgment motion, and a 4-day trial in December 2006. In pre-Judgment 
proceedings, CARE offered expert testimony on range safety considerations and presented an 
array of exhibits regarding range design from the National Rifle Association, National Shooting 
Sports Foundation, U.S. military, and other sources. E.g., Court Exh. 4, CARE Exh. 2-6, 18-19, 
32-34,38,43. In its post-trial brief in 2006, CARE advocated for permanent closure of the 
Range, or alternatively that the Range meet the "No Blue Sky" Rule. AR 215-17. 
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The district court recognized the challenge of standards in its Memorandum Decision and 
Order following summary judgment proceedings in 2006. See AR 91-93. Referencing local, 
military, and NRA safety guidelines, the court concluded "this trial may primarily be a trial of 
experts as to not only what standard(s) are most appropriate, but what portions of the most 
applicable standard(s) do and do not apply." AR 93. Following the 2006 trial, the district court 
determined what portions of the most applicable standards should apply to the Range. The court 
did not apply or reference either military guidelines or the NRA Source Book in its Judgment or 
underlying Order. AR 281-2; AR 278-79. Instead, the district court chose to invoke the CARE-
advocated requirement of the "No Blue Sky Rule" or an alternative requirement based on a 
document by Clark Vargas (distinct from than the NRA Source Book) for its more stringent 
standard to open the Range to more than 500 shooters per year. See id. To allow reopening of 
the Range for up to 500 shooters, the district court fashioned a lesser standard to install a baffle 
over each shooting position to prevent fire above the back berm. See id. 
IDFG reasonably installed baffles to prevent shooters from firing above the berm behind 
the target and compiled evidence to demonstrate compliance with this condition. In the post-
Judgment proceedings, however, over IDFG's objections and related motions (e.g., AR 951, 
Find. of Fact ~35; TR 135-37, 141-46,491-96), the district court erred in allowing CARE to 
essentially retry its principal case as to applicable safety features, ostensibly to help the court 
"interpret" the injunction's requirement for installation of a baffle over every shooting position 
to address the "problem of ricochets" that had been "overlooked" in the pre-judgment 
proceedings. AR 942-46,955-957,983,986; TR 142, l. 9-17. 
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At CARE's urging, the district court interpreted its stated safety requirement to reopen 
the range for up to 500 shooters to incorporate two additional, unstated safety features: ground 
baffles and an eyebrow berm or bullet catcher, which had been referenced in some of CARE's 
2006 Trial exhibits. AR 956-57, Concl. of Law ~~9, 12; see also 945-946 (regarding Exh. 6 and 
Exh. 2 references to ground baffles and eyebrow ricochet catcher). Similarly, the district court 
erred by allowing CARE, in post-judgment proceedings, to present U.S. Air Force guidelines and 
conventions that had not been presented in the 2006 trial, through the testimony of a retired Air 
Force engineer. Because the district court allowed this information to influence its expansion of 
the Judgment well beyond its express terms, this error was not harmless. For example, the 
district court compared IDFG's safety improvements to Air Force Engineering Technical Letters 
(ETL) and other guidelines not relied upon in framing the 2007 injunction. AR 957, Concl. Of 
Law ~1 0 (the range "was not designed and constructed by ID FG to meet the professional 
standards set forth by Clark Vargas in the National Rifle Association Range Source Book (1999 
version) and the ETL"); see also AR 945; 951-52, Find. of Fact ~~36, 42, 43. 
Where CARE sought to raise new issues post-judgment or revisit information previously 
provided to the court but not referenced in its injunction, the district court should have required 
CARE to comply with I.R.C.P. 60(b). See State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329, 246 P.3d 979, 
982 (2011)(citation omitted). To rely on Rule 60(b)(5), for example, a movant must show "(1) 
that the judgment is prospective in nature; and (2) that it is no longer equitable to enforce the 
judgment as written." Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 118-119,666 P.2d 639,645-646 (1983) ("a 
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movant must also show a sufficient change of circumstances rendering enforcement of the 
judgment inequitable"). 
Not only did the district court allow CARE to retry its original case, it allowed CARE to 
do so free ofthe burden that properly belongs to CARE for post-judgment relief under I.R.C.P. 
60(b). Indeed, the district court did not even require CARE to meet the burden it recognized 
CARE bore in the original nuisance action: 
AR89. 
In order to obtain an injunction against, or the abatement of, an alleged nuisance, 
the complaining party must show a clear case supporting his right to relief. 
Larsen v. Village of Lava Hot Springs, 88 Idaho 64, 73, 396 P.2d 471 (1964) 
(emphasis added). A showing that there is a possibility of injury will not sustain 
the injunctive relief sought. fd 
For the purpose of fashioning equitable relief in a nuisance case, "[t]he restraint 
imposed by an injunction should not be more extensive than is reasonably 
required to protect the interests of the party in whose favor it is granted, and 
should not be so broad as to prevent defendant from exercising its rights .... " 
Kolstadv. Rankin, 179 Ill. App. 3d 1022,1034,534 N.E. 2d 1373,1381 (Ill Appl. 
1989). 
AR 954, Conel. of Law ~5; see also AR 263, Concl. Of Law ~5. 
Instead of CARE's being responsible for meeting these burdens, the district court placed 
the burden on IDFG to explain why the court should not consider an issue the parties did not 
discuss at the underlying trial--the issue of ricochets--and placed the burden on IDFG to address 
the issue in regards to IDFG's compliance with the 2007 Judgment: 
While ricochets were not discussed in 2006, IDFG has not made any cogent 
argument as to why the problem of ricochets should not be considered by this 
Court relative to IDFG's motion to partially lift the injunction. 
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AR 956, Concl. of Law ~6 (emphasis in original). 
The district court's method of determining compliance with the terms of its injunction 
creates the proverbial moving target and leaves IDFG to guess what "implied" or "overlooked" 
problems it must address in the future. 12 The district court's approach is at odds with procedural 
rule requirements and the principles of due process and equity. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
IDFG requests the following relief: 
• That the Court conclude as a matter oflaw that IDFG has met the 2007 Judgment's 
condition to reopen the 100-yard shooting area for up to 500 shooters per year, given the 
district court's Finding of Fact (AR 949 ~23) (per CARE's agreement and as otherwise 
evidenced by the record), that IDFG has installed baffles over each of the 12 shooting 
positions in the 100-yard shooting area sufficient to prevent shooters (from prone to 
standing) from firing above the berm behind the target; and that the Court remand the 
proceedings to the district court to partially lift the injunction to reopen the 100-yard 
shooting area at Farragut Range for up to 500 shooters per year consistent with this 
conclusion; 
12 In fact, it remains unclear from the district court's latest interpretation what will satisfY the court to lift the 
injunction for up to 500 shooters. The district court only indicates partial lifting "should' occur with the addition of 
ground baffles in conjunction with overhead baffles and an eyebrow berm or bullet catcher, not that it "will" or 
"shall." AR 957, Concl. Of Law ,12; see also Concl. Of Law ~9 at AR 956-957. The district court has also 
signaled its willingness to make future sua sponte modifications to the 2007 Judgment. See AR 950, Find. of Fact ~, 
27,28, (fmding that standard operating procedures for the Range drafted by IDFG and the Idaho Department of 
Parks and Recreation "will need to be made a requirement in a future court order, and will need to be made part of a 
judgment, so that IDFG does not unilaterally change these procedures in the future, after this litigation has 
concluded"). 
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• That the Court reverse the district court's decision regarding the constitutionality of the 
Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act and conclude as a matter oflaw that the Idaho 
Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act is constitutional and applicable to the Farragut 
Shooting Range; and 
• That the Court remand the proceedings to the district court to determine IDFG's 
compliance with the conditions to reopen the Range for more than 500 shooters, by 
compliance with the "No Blue Sky Rule" or, alternatively, the criteria espoused by Clark 
Vargas, as stated in the district court's 2007 Memorandum Decision and Order in support 
of the 2007 Judgment. 
<fI--. 
DATED this 0 day of March 2012. 
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